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Abstract—This paper presents a system that allows the secure
remote configuration of an FPGA, which is assumed to be the
only device in the secure zone. This means that no security
critical information passes over the borders of the FPGA chip,
reducing the opportunities for an attacker to break the system.
In particular, bitstream compression in combination with partial
reconfiguration is used to avoid the use of an external memory for
the storage of the bitstream. Additionally there is no need for an
external processor for the transfer of the bitstream. Nevertheless,
our solution contains a mechanism that verifies the integrity of
the complete bitstream before starting the configuration. This
prevents attempts to load unqualified bitstreams and reduces the
downtime. The integrity check, the decryption, the authentication
of the origin and the freshness check of the bitstream are
performed inside the FPGA while its current configuration is still
active. The contribution of this work is that it presents the first
complete working system for the secure remote configuration of
FPGAs, consisting of a single FPGA chip and an initiating server,
given that the integrity of the complete bitstream is verified before
configuration. This paper gives details on the overall system and
the FPGA architecture, which have been implemented and tested.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electrical devices can be shipped with an FPGA. This comes
at higher cost on material, but the lifespan of such devices
can be extended. An FPGA driven electrical device can be
reconfigured to solve potential issues in hardware or software.
Additionally, these devices can be tailored to the users’ needs,
by adding and removing features on the FPGA.
Various research projects have studied remote reconfigu-
ration of FPGAs. The focuses of these studies can mainly
be divided into two groups: those with a focus on IP cores
and those with a focus on general FPGA reconfiguration.
Both groups have overlapping requirements such as: com-
munication of new configurations, and securing this com-
munication. Differences in both groups are mainly towards
interconnectivity of a reconfigurable partition and the static
partition in which the former resides. Within the group focused
on IP cores, the interconnectivity is very strict. Also the
available reconfigurable resources in a reconfigurable partition
are defined very precisely. In the group focused on general
FPGA reconfiguration, these restrictions are relatively loose
in the sense that the designer has more resources available
to implement the design and the interconnectivity is more
flexible. This work focuses on the latter group.
With the focus on general FPGA reconfiguration there are
no functional connections between the static partition and
the reconfigurable partition. Also the reconfigurable partition
is preferably as large as possible. This unavoidably reflects
in large partial bitstreams which results in large storage
requirements in the static partition. Every configuration bit,
determining the behavior of the reconfigurable partition, has to
be rewritten. For Block RAMs (BRAM) also the initialization
values of the memory, which tend to have high entropy,
are explicitly stored in the bitstream. This implies that a
configuration of an FPGA can never be stored on the on-chip
memory of the same FPGA.
This work provides a solution for general FPGA recon-
figurations of FPGAs in the field which are connected to
the Internet. The partial bitstream never leaves the FPGA
chip. This reduces the opportunities on which an attacker can
attack the scheme. The single-chip solution is implemented
and tested, for which the results are also taken up in this work.
In sect. II an overview is given about published work
on remote FPGA reconfiguration and bitstream compression.
The solution to achieve a single-chip solution is explained in
sect. III, while sect. IV explains the prototype implementation.
This work ends on sect. V which draws conclusions and
discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Within the scope of this work two different fields of
research are combined: 1) the (secure) remote reconfiguration
of FPGAs, and 2) the compression of partial bitstreams. This
section gives an overview of published work on both topics.
A. Remote reconfiguration of an FPGA
In 2004, Hu¨bner et al. describe a real-time, dynamic re-
configuration of an FPGA [1]. Their bitstream is compressed
using Lempel-Ziv-based algorithms and then delivered to the
FPGA in an off-line setting. While their focus was on real-time
behavior and efficient decompression, our solution combines
these features with remote configuration and security.
A system for remote self-reconfiguration of an FPGA is
presented by Castillo et al. [2], which downloads a bitstream
from a TFTP server which is stored in external ZBT SRAM.
In 2008, Gonzalez et al. published [3] in which they
present an IP core based solution to assist the processor in
cryptographic calculations. Their system provides a single
reconfigurable partition in which an implementation of the re-
quested cryptographic algorithm can be configured. The work
does not state whether the partial bitstreams are communicated
or stored in an external component.
Devic et al. present in [4] and [5] a secure protocol and an
implementation which offer remote bitstream updates. They
foresee countermeasures against replay attacks and bitstream
spoofing and provide a solution without the need for external
memory. The difference with our solution is that we do not
perform on-the-fly configuration, but we perform an integrity
check on the complete bitstream before configuration. This
makes it more challenging to obtain an implementation with-
out external memory but prevents configuration incomplete
and/or corrupted bitstreams.
The work of Kepa et al. [6] presents a secure reconfig-
uration controller. Using SeReCon, they allow updating and
interchanging IP cores.
A new protocol for secure, remote updates of FPGA con-
figurations is presented by Drimer in [7], providing confiden-
tiality, integrity and freshness of the bitstream. A non-volatile
memory is used for storing the incoming data either encrypted
or already decrypted.
In [8], Braeken et al. describe an on-line system handling in-
coming bitstreams, providing data confidentiality and authen-
tication, and mutual explicit key authentication. Their work
uses external flash memory to store the incoming bitstream,
which means the FPGA goes off-line between configurations
which could threaten the security.
B. Bitstream compression
In [9], Pan et al. present a new technique: Difference Vector
compression, which achieves data compression by sending
only the differences between a configuration frame and a
beneficiary frame. They extend this technique by reading back
frames from the current configuration, which are used as a
reference to build the Difference Vector.
Koch et al. evaluate three techniques: run-length encoding,
Lempel-Ziv algorithms and Huffman compression [10]. They
compare these techniques on a set of benchmark bitstreams
both on compression ratio and resource cost of the decom-
pressor.
Haiyun and Shurong have implemented in [11] the LZW
algorithm [12]. Their work achieves a compression ratio of
43.69% for partial bitstreams.
The work of S¸tefan and Cot¸ofanaˇ [13] focuses on bitstreams
for the Xilinx Virtex 4 devices. They use several techniques
and combinations of techniques to achieve bitstream com-
pression; and they discuss the accompanying hardware im-
plementations to perform the decompression. They draw two
main conclusions: 1) the internal organization of bitstreams is
likely to change between FPGA families and 2) synthesis tools
produce bitstreams with the ratio of “0” and “1” symbols as
the main source of redundancy. The latter turns the focus on
the simpler compression methods.
A combination of run-length encoding and bitmask-based
compression is used in the work of Qin et al. [14]. They
outperform other compression techniques, while maintaining
high speed decompression.
Note that most research on bitstream compression is per-
formed to reduce the configuration time of the FPGA, while
our goal is to avoid the need for an external memory.
In summary, many features of our solution have been imple-
mented in different settings and with different constraints, but
our work presents the first working system combining secure
remote configuration with bitstream compression to obtain a
single-chip solution, for the general reconfiguration of an on-
line FPGA.
III. SINGLE-CHIP SOLUTION
To achieve a single-chip solution for a general FPGA
reconfiguration, this work uses partial reconfiguration and
bitstream compression. Additionally, the communication of the
FPGA updates is secured against various types of attacks.
A. Partial reconfiguration
Configuring an FPGA generally occurs in one iteration. This
implies that altering a configuration results in reconfiguring the
complete FPGA, independent of the size of the update. Partial
reconfiguration has been introduced to avoid this inefficient
method. Using the partial reconfiguration techniques the re-
sources of an FPGA get divided in two or more partitions:
a single static partition and one or more reconfigurable par-
titions. The former stays configured and working while the
latter can be altered. The bitstream which reconfigures the
reconfigurable partition is referred to as a partial bitstream.
In the scope of this work the static partition will only contain
the communication and the reconfiguration components. The
actual application of the FPGA will be placed in a single
reconfigurable partition. With this setting, it is clear the static
partition should be as small possible, thus leaving maximum
resources for the actual application. Another consequence of
this setting is that every signal to or from the reconfigurable
partition has to be routed upon initial configuration.
When the electrical device is turned on, the static partition
gets configured with a bitstream which should be encrypted.
This is required because the private key of the electrical device
is stored in the full bitstream.
B. Bitstream compression
There exist a lot of compression algorithms which offer
lossless data compression. It needs no further explication that
lossy compression algorithms are unsuitable. For clarity it is
noted that the compression ratio (CR) is defined as:
CR =
size(compressed bitstream)
size(original bitstream)
As proven in [9], additional gains on the CR can be achieved
by thoroughly observing what the data represent. For partial
bitstreams this comes down to describing configuration frames,
which are the smallest reconfigurable units of an FPGA.
Many algorithms are based on Lempel-Ziv, Huffman encod-
ing and/or run-length encoding. Lempel-Ziv-based algorithms
focus on substitutions of repeating occurrences which are
maintained in a dictionary [15]. Huffman coding uses short
words to represent frequently occurring words, while infre-
quently occurring words are represented by longer words. For
decompression, the Huffman tree needs to be reconstructed.
This is considered to be costly [10][13]. Run-length encoding
is a very simple technique, which compresses the data by
indicating consecutive repetitions in the data. The compressed
output will exist of pairs of (w, l) describing the content of
the input. The w field defines a word while the l field gives
the number of repetitions of this word. All three mentioned
algorithms have a fixed word-size in a given compression, but
this word-size is adjustable.
C. Communication
To be able to remotely update an FPGA, some form of
communication is required. Because this communication
channel passes through non-trusted environments, the
communication has to be secured. This boils down to offering
these concepts:
Entity authentication offers guarantee that the entity
with whom one is communicating is in fact the intended
entity. Mutual entity authentication is achieved when entity
authentication is available in both directions.
Data authentication offers guarantee that the message which
is received is in fact the same message as the one that was
sent. This concept makes sure any alterations to the message
can be detected.
Data confidentiality offers guarantee that the message can
only be read by the entities authorized to read it.
In literature lots of cryptographic algorithms are described
which offer any combination of the mentioned concepts.
In [16], several protocols are thoroughly described. The group
of the key establishment protocols result in a secret which is
shared between the communicating entities. This secret can be
used as a cryptographic key. Although it is an expensive choice
with regards to communication and calculation, the Station-
To-Station (STS) protocol offers mutual, explicit key authen-
tication and mutual entity authentication when establishing a
session key. It is noted that the STS protocol was originally
presented more that 25 year ago in [17], but is still considered
unbroken and is used all over the world.
D. Security measures
Using the STS protocol instates a number of security
measures. With the three concepts mentioned in III-C, vulne-
rabilities against spoofing attacks, IP theft, man-in-the-middle
attacks are covered. The use of freshly generated session keys
prevents replay attacks. The fact that the partial bitstream never
leaves the FPGA chip is stressed again, because this reduces
the fronts on which the scheme can be attack.
E. The single-chip solution
With a static partition that handles the communication pro-
tocol and performs all the cryptographic calculations, a partial
bitstream can be sent securely to the FPGA. If this bitstream
is compressed with a sufficiently large CR, it can be stored
on BRAM in the static partition. The static partition, also
having access to the reconfiguration primitives, can reconfigure
the main application of the FPGA, after decompression and
verification.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section the implementation of a single-chip, secure
remote FPGA reconfiguration is described. To the best of
our knowledge this is the first implementation of such a
scheme. For this implementation it is assumed there is a
reconfiguration server which is the only authorized entity to
request a reconfiguration. The electrical device, containing
the FPGA, is shipped from a trusted environment where the
encrypted initial bitstream is stored on the device. Finally, the
electrical device is assumed to be connected to the Internet.
The implementation described here is built on a ML507
development board by Xilinx, which contains a Xilinx Virtex-
5 device (XC5V FX70T). The implementation is made using
the Xilinx ISE Design Suite, version 14.5. The choice of the
compression algorithm is run-length encoding. The reason for
this choice is its simplicity [13], the fact it is not optimized
for one FPGA family, and the small decompressor overhead.
A. The static partition
The main task of the static partition is the receiving of a
new partial bitstream and the passing down of this bitstream
to the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP). This task
is handled by a MicroBlaze, 32-bit softcore processor. To
handle the calculation-intense cryptographic operations several
additional hardware components are required, together with an
additional internal BRAM component dedicated to temporarily
store the incoming bitstream. For this implementation only
a single 36 kilobits BRAM is used, which suffices this
implementation’s need. The remaining BRAMs in the static
partition could additionally be used if necessary.
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Fig. 1. The interconnected components in the static partition
Fig. 1 shows the MicroBlaze as controlling microprocessor,
connected to the IP cores through a processor local bus. The
attached cores are: an Ethernet core, the additional BRAM, the
cryptocore, an ICAP-core and a placeholder component. With
exception of the cryptocore and the placeholder, all IP cores
are default IP cores, available in the development environment.
Because the tool flow for partial reconfiguration implies that
the static system is the top-level of the design, a placeholder
has to be added. This placeholder is an empty IP component
instantiating a black-box entity which will be occupied by
the reconfigurable partition. Due to this approach every signal
which is required in the reconfigurable partition has be routed
to the black-box entity. Although this would request thorough
planning on current and future inputs and outputs, it may
be avoided by routing all signals, except those required for
the static partition, to the reconfigurable partition. For the
presented implementation only the general purpose IO signals
are routed to the reconfigurable partition, together with the
clock and reset signals.
Fig. 2. A rotated floorplan of the FPGA with placed and routed static partition
The placed and routed static partition is visualized in Fig. 2.
This image shows that all resources, occupied by the static
system, are placed on the south side of the device with only
a few lines going into the reconfigurable partition. These
lines represent nets to connect certain IO pins located in the
reconfigurable partition to the static partition and the nets
between the static and reconfigurable partitions.
1) The software: As mentioned above, the MicroBlaze will
handle the communication. The UDP/IP protocol is chosen
which is commonly supported and has a more lightweight
stack then TCP/IP. The software firstly performs an initializa-
tion of the IP cores and secondly starts polling the Ethernet
core. After handling incoming ARP requests, the software
looks for IPV4 packets which are destined for the electrical
device.
Packets of which the UDP payload starts with a hexadecimal
character “73” belong to the STS-protocol. After finishing this
protocol, a session key is established between the FPGA and
the configuration server. Packets starting with a hexadecimal
“64” belong to the reconfiguration protocol. The partial bit-
stream is assumed to be larger than the maximum payload of
a single UDP frame. Because of this, the partial bitstream is
split in chunks. The software on the MicroBlaze accepts three
requests: 1) the reception of a new chunk, 2) the verification
of the received chunks and 3) the request to reconfigure the
FPGA. A more detailed explanation is given in sect. IV-B.
2) The cryptocore: The cryptocore is a custom built IP-
core which offers four cryptographic building blocks: an AES-
128 component, a SHA-256 component, a random number
generator (RNG) and an elliptic curve processor (ECP). All
these components are implemented as described in respec-
tively: [18][19][20][21]. Every component has a focus on
area, thus contributing to keeping the static partition small.
For the sake of completeness it is mentioned that the mode
of operation used around the symmetric key cipher is the
output feedback mode (OFB) [22]. The four components are
interconnected through a single BRAM, and are controlled by
a command register and a status register. The block diagram
of the complete cryptocore is shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. The block diagram of the cryptocore
For more details on the cryptocore we refer to [8] and [21].
B. The reconfiguration protocol
As already mentioned in sect. IV-A1, the partial bitstream is
assumed to consist of multiple chunks. For Ethernet, not using
Gigabit Ethernet, the payload of a single packet is 1500 bytes.
Because of encapsulation 20 bytes are lost to the IP header
and 8 bytes are lost to the UDP header. The reconfiguration
protocol used in this work costs another 9 bytes. The first byte
is to indicate whether a UDP-frame is part of the STS-protocol
or the reconfiguration protocol. The next byte indicates in
which phase of the protocol this frame is to be positioned.
The following two bytes contain an order number, because
with the UDP protocol, out-of-order receiving of frames is
possible. The order number gives the relative position of the
chunk in the entire bitstream. The next byte provides the word-
size while the last two bytes provide the length-size, used
in the run-length encoding. Finally, with all encapsulation in
place the maximum payload is 1465 bytes.
To be able to validate the integrity of a single chunk a
message authentication code (MAC) is added to every chunk.
The algorithm used to calculate the MAC is HMAC [23],
because an implementation of a hash function is already
available in the cryptocore. Because a single chunk will be
encrypted, together with a MAC of h bytes, using AES with
a block-size of b bytes, the maximal, optimized chunk size c
is payload − h − [(payload − h)mod b]. With a payload of
1465 bytes, a 256-bit MAC and a block-size of 16 bytes for
AES, the chunk size is 1424 bytes.
C. Requesting an update
To start an update, the STS-protocol has to be completed,
first. This results in a 256-bit session key which gets divided
into a key for encryption and a key for message authentication.
Subsequently the reconfiguration server has to prepare the
bitstream for dispatch. This is visualized in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Partial bitstream segmentation for communication over Ethernet
In a first step the partial bitstream is compressed with the
run-length encoding compression algorithm. Because this is a
simple algorithm, an exhaustive exploration can be done on the
reconfiguration server to find the word and length sizes result-
ing in the best compression for that specific partial bitstream.
Secondly the compressed partial bitstream is divided in chunks
of 1424 bytes. These chunks are preceded with a 32-byte MAC
on the chunk. Next these 1456-byte chunks are encrypted using
AES-128 in OFB mode which results in an encrypted chunk
of 1456 bytes. The complete cipher-text is finally preceded
with the 7 bytes reconfiguration header of which the second
byte is “0x32” to request the reception of a new chunk. This
results in a 1463 bytes message, which gets encapsulated
with the UDP and IPV4 headers to finally result in a 1491
payload for the Ethernet frame. The third step is to send every
chunk to the electrical device. The FPGA stores every chunk
in the dedicated BRAM, on a position determined by the 2-
byte offset in the reconfiguration header. When all chunks are
sent, the reconfiguration server should ask for a verification
in a fourth step. To do so, a MAC on the entire compressed
bitstream is to be calculated and preceded with “0x6433”.
After receiving such a request, the FPGA: 1) decrypts every
chunk, 2) verifies every MAC on every chunk and 3) verifies
the MAC on the entire bitstream. If all verifications succeed,
an internal flag on the MicroBlaze gets set and the success
is reported back to the reconfiguration server. Subsequently
the dedicated BRAM gets reorganized to have a continuous
plaint-text bitstream in memory, by removing all MACs. Fig. 5
shows the evolution of the dedicated BRAM throughout a
reconfiguration request. In the fifth and final step, a request is
sent to reconfigure the FPGA. This request only gets granted
when the internal flag is set, which ensures that a complete and
validated bitstream is present on the FPGA, which prevents
hitches or incomplete reconfigurations. Moreover, because the
complete bitstream is already at the FPGA, the downtime of
the main application is kept at a minimum.
D. Results
The implementation as described above is completely imple-
mented and tested. The resource usage of this implementation
is presented in Table I.
out-of-order
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the dedicated BRAM throughout a reconfiguration
component #Slices #BRAM #DSP48E
Used by ECP 866 10 2
Used by SHA256 602 0 0
Used by RNG 294 0 0
Used by AES128 979 4 0
Used by cryptocore 2985 15 2
Used by static partition 4017 50 5
Available in static partition 4560 60 40
Available in reconfigurable partition 6640 88 80
Available in XC5V FX70T 11200 148 128
TABLE I
RESOURCE USAGE OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS, THE
CRYPTOCORE AND BOTH PARTITIONS
With a relative usage of around 35%, Table I shows the
cost of the static partition is high. The cryptocore is designed
with a focus on area and is relatively small [8]. The additional
resources used by the static partition are spent on the MicroB-
laze with the accompanying bus and the remaining IP cores.
Building a lightweight system-on-chip for the static partition
could free more resources for the reconfigurable partition.
In sect. IV-A a single BRAM was provided to store the
partial bitstream. Table I indicates this can be increased with
ten additional BRAMs, resulting in the ability to store a
compressed bitstream up to 396 kilobits, which may suffice for
small applications with no initialized BRAM. With the seg-
mentation as described in this implementation, uncompressed
partial bitstreams are 1588 kilobytes. This implies that the CR
should achieve 25% which is quite high, but is achievable
if the resource occupation is lenient. If certain applications
require more storage, the boundaries between the static and
the reconfigurable partition should be shifted.
Table I also shows that the main application still has an
acceptable amount of resources to occupy on this FPGA.
E. Improvements on the solution
Two parameters that could improve the presented solution
are the size of the MAC and an inter-chunk adjustable word
and length size. If the size of the MAC could shrink, the
dedicated memory to store a partial bitstream could be used
more efficiently. Although not yet implemented, the chunk
header offers the possibility to adjust the word and length size
between chunks. Additional to the gains in CR, the drawbacks
from compressing high-entropy data will have a smaller impact
because performing run-length encoding on high-entropy data
will increase the data size rather than compress it.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
1) Security: The communication channel is the connection
between the reconfiguration server and the electrical device.
It is assumed this channel is observable by anyone and the
message is adaptable by anyone. The STS protocol ensures
data authentication, data confidentiality and mutual entity
authentication. The chunks are decrypted on the FPGA chip
and never leave this chip, in contrast with other work that
targets general FPGA reconfiguration. When the MAC on the
entire bitstream is validated, it can be assumed that every
bitstream chunk has arrived at the FPGA and that the initial
order of the chunks has been restored correctly. The MAC
on a single chunk can be used to flag to the reconfiguration
server which chunk is failing, but this is not implemented yet.
Because the FPGA actively participates in the establishment
of the session key and contributes to the key material, replay
attacks are covered.
2) Single-chip solution: This work combines a simple data
compression technique and remote reconfiguration techniques
to obtain a single-chip solution for the remote reconfiguration
of FPGAs. With the static partition responsible for the secure
communication and reconfiguration of the partial bitstream, the
single reconfigurable partition holds the main application of
the FPGA. Efforts have been made to keep the static partition
as small as possible thus leaving the reconfigurable partition
to a maximum size. An implementation of this solution is
built and tested, and proves the feasibility of this single chip
solution, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first single
chip solution for general FPGA reconfiguration. The solution
also prevents the loading of incomplete bitstreams and reduces
the downtime of the main application.
3) Future work: The authors are planning to work on three
fronts. First is the assimilating of state-of-the-art compression
techniques. Secondly, improvements on shrinking the static
partition are to be explored, and finally an optimum towards
hardware-software co-design is to be looked for. The latter is to
be done by moving cryptographic algorithms from hardware to
software while keeping the additional BRAM-cost acceptable.
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